Decision makers typically overweight small probabilities and underweight large.
INTRODUCTION
. In decision making under risk, the participant chooses between lotteries where both outcomes and probabilities are explicitly given, e.g.
 
0.2,$200;0.8,$0 .
Expected utility theory (EUT, Bernoulli, 1738 Bernoulli, /1954 ) is a normative model of decision under risk. Each outcome i O in a lottery L is assigned a numerical "utility"
U O and the expected utility of the lottery is,
The EUT decision maker chooses the lottery with the highest expected utility.
Human decision makers typically depart from the predictions of EUT by overweighting small probabilities and underweighting large (Allais, 1953; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Luce, 2000) . This distortion of probability is captured by a probability weighting function
In Figure 1 we show three instances of a particular model of the probability weighting function with one free parameter  due to Tversky & Kahneman (1992) . The green curve is based on data observed in one condition of an experiment they report. For values of 1   small probabilities are overweighted, large probabilities underweighted, the typical pattern observed in decision under risk experiments.
For many of the decisions we make, we are not given explicit specifications of probability in numerical form. Often we have only the remembered relative frequency of events across time. The relative frequency of events is arguably the predominant if not sole source of information for non-human animals (Stephens & Krebs, 1986) .
Recently researchers have examined whether the source of probability information in a decision task affects the decisions we make (Erev, Ert, Roth, Haruvvy, et al., 2010; Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hadar & Fox, 2009; Hau, Pleskac & Hertwig, 2010; Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004; Rakow, Demes & Newell, 2008; Ungemach, Chater & Stewart, 2009; Wu, Delgado & Maloney, 2009 , 2011 . Wu, Delgado & Maloney (2009 , 2011 compared human decision making under risk in a classical decision task ("decision from description") and a mathematically equivalent choice between "motor lotteries". A motor lottery consisted of a speeded reaching task to a rectangular target. If the participant hit the target, he or she earned a reward (and otherwise received nothing) and the size of the rectangle determined the probability of success. Wu et al. (2009 Wu et al. ( , 2011 found that, while participants choosing between lotteries in classical form tended to overweight small probabilities and underweight large, the same participants, when presented with the equivalent motor decision task, showed the reverse pattern, underweighting small, and overweighting large. The red curve with 1   in Figure 1 illustrates this second pattern. The same participants in a classical decision making task with probabilities explicitly given had the expected pattern of probability distortion with 1   . Ungemach, Chater & Stewart (2009) reported patterned differences in use of probability in comparison of a classical decision task and a matched decision task in which probability information was obtained through sampling. In the classical decision task participants chose between lotteries which were presented in numerical form. In the sampling condition, participants sampled each of two events 40 times by pressing keys.
Ungemach et al found that participants' choices were consistent with underweighting smaller probabilities and overweighting large, i.e. 1   in Figure 1 . In the classical decision task, they found the typical overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of large 1
Both Wu et al (2009 Wu et al ( , 2011 and Ungemach et al (2009) verified that participants'
estimates of the frequency of motor success or success in sampling were close to accurate.
A natural conjecture is that, whenever probability is based on observed or remembered frequency, the use of probability in decision making will exhibit the reversed pattern ( 1
Here we test this conjecture by comparing decision making with probabilities learned through sampling a large number of random visual events and decision making with probabilities explicitly stated. The random visual event was the outcome of a Gaussian "stochastic bullet" aimed at a rectangular target. The path of the stochastic bullet was a Gaussian random walk resembling a lightning bolt. We varied the probability that the bullet would hit the rectangular target by varying the width of the rectangle. Figure 2A gives an example of three possible realizations of the stochastic bullet aimed at three rectangles varying in width. In the example, the bullet "hits" two times out of three.
--Figure 2--
In summary, we focused on human performance with large samples. Moreover, the number of practice and decision trials was fixed in advance by the experimenter and We illustrate the visual decision task in Figure 2B . There are two rectangles differing in width with monetary rewards assigned to either of the two targets. The participants choose whether to bet on the bullet hitting the upper target or hitting the lower. In the example, a hit on the smaller rectangle will earn $2 while a hit on the larger rectangle, though more likely, will earn only $1. In Figure 2B we illustrate the classical decision task, a decision between two lotteries that differ in probability and outcome.
In the first phase of the experiment, the participant viewed 300 realizations of the stochastic bullet aimed at rectangles of different sizes and could potentially learn the mapping between rectangle width and the probability with which the stochastic bullet will hit the target.
We estimated probability weighting functions in both decision making tasks (Figure 2 ), for each participant individually. Following Wu et al (2009 Wu et al ( , 2011 and Ungemach et al (2009) we also asked participants to directly estimate the frequency of visual events on a numerical scale. That is, they were shown a bullet and rectangle and asked to estimate the probability of a hit. We compared these three estimates of probability/frequency to test whether (1) the source of probability information affects the probability weighting function and (2) whether any differences in the probability weight function in the two decision tasks can be attributed to a simple misperception of the frequency of visual events.
We found large, patterned differences between the probability weighting functions for the two decision tasks with the probability weighting functions based on random visual events exhibiting greater distortion. Participants typically overweighted small probabilities and underweighted large probabilities in the visual task in contrast to the patterns of probability weight distortion found by Ungemach et al (2009) and Wu et al (2009 Wu et al ( , 2011 . We also found that participants' estimates of the relative frequency of events were close to veridical and could not explain their use of probability in visual decision making.
METHODS

Apparatus
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room in front of a monitor (1280 x 1024 pixel at 60 HZ; 1 pixel = 0.026 mm). We recorded responses by means of a computer keyboard mounted on a table centered in front of the monitor. The experiment was run using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997 ) on a Pentium IV Dell Precision workstation.
Participants
12 NYU undergraduate students participated in this experiment. All were unaware of the purpose of the experiment and all were paid for their participation. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. Participants were paid for their time and also received a bonus based on their performance paid at the end of the experiment.
Stimuli
The stochastic bullet. The participant observed a bullet that followed a visible random walk from the screen center upward (or downward) to a horizontal reward line ( Figure 2 ).
The center of the screen was marked by a small figure we refer to as the shooter. The random walk consisted of a series of 101 N  line segments connecting a series of points, beginning at the shooter and ending at the reward line. In the visual decision task described below, the shooter could shoot the bullet upward or downward. We describe the construction of the stimulus for a bullet traveling upward.
The vertical coordinates of the successive points increased by 1/ N th of the vertical distance from the screen center to the lower edge of the target rectangle so that the last point fell somewhere on the line containing the lower edge of the target rectangle. The horizontal coordinate of each point was displaced by a random offset from that of the previous point. The offsets were independent, drawn from a Gaussian ( ;0,
where   2 ; , x    denotes the Gaussian probability density function with location parameter  and variance 2  and w denotes the width of the rectangle. The mapping from w to p is invertible. Given any specified probability p we can compute the corresponding w .
Experimental design
The experiment consisted of five phases. The first four are illustrated in Figure 2B . Each participant completed all five phases in the order we describe next.
1. Experience phase. The purpose of the experience phase was to familiarize the participant with the mapping between the width of the rectangle and the probability that the stochastic bullet would hit the target. A single target was always displayed in the upper half of the screen, centered above the shooter. The width of the rectangle varied randomly from trial to trial.
On each trial of the experience phase, the participant observed the random walk from the screen center upward to the lower edge of the target rectangle. The participant's task was to judge whether the bullet hit the reward line within the target region and respond by key press. Participants were told the correct response after every trial. Each participant judged 300 trials with rectangles whose widths varied across the same range as in the visual decision task.
2. Visual decision phase. In this phase, participants chose between two target rectangles, one displayed above, one below the screen center. Once the participant had selected a target, the stochastic bullet was fired twice, first at the selected target rectangle, next at the non-selected target rectangle. Hitting the larger target rectangle always corresponded to winning $1, hitting the smaller, to winning $2. The larger rectangle was randomly placed above or below the shooter with equal probability.
The larger target rectangles ($1) were fixed at one of six sizes corresponding to probabilities (.1 .2 .4 .6 .8 .9); the size of the smaller target rectangle ($2) was adjusted across 33 successive trials using an adaptive staircase procedure (Leek, 2001) . The values assigned to both regions were fixed throughout a session of 396 trials (v 1 = $2 / v 2 = $1). We varied the width of the target with value v 2 from trial to trial to estimate probability p 2 such that the participant was indifferent between (p 1 , v 1 ) and (p 2 , v 2 ).
The participants had no control over the stopping rule. All staircases were run for a fixed number of trials.
At the end of the experiment, three trials were randomly selected and the participant was paid the outcome of those three trials. The participant was informed of this payment method at the beginning of the visual decision session.
this phase of the experiment, the participant was presented with target rectangles of different sizes and typed in a number between 0 and 100 as an estimate of the probability (in percent form) with which the bullet had hit the target rectangle of this particular size. The size of the target was determined by randomly selecting a probability between 10 and 90, turning it into a width (in mm) and then presenting it visually to the participant. No feedback was given. This phase of the experiment consisted of 120 trials. .6 .8 .9), stated in frequencies on the screen; the probability assigned to the higher outcome ($2) was adjusted across 33 successive trials using an adaptive staircase procedure (Leek, 2001) . The values assigned to both regions remained fixed throughout the session of 396 trials. We varied the probability assigned to the higher outcome ($2) from trial to trial to estimate the probability p 2 such that the participant was indifferent
5. Payoff phase. Participants were paid for their participation and received an additional bonus, depending on the outcome of three classical lottery trials and three visual lottery trials selected at random. We "replayed" the actual random walk that had previously occurred on each of the randomly chosen visual lottery trials and then paid participants according to their winnings. These payoffs occurred only after all data was collected and the experiment was otherwise complete.
Probability weighting and value functions
We characterized human performance in each phase by fitting performance to a parametric model, Kahneman & Tversky's Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 Tversky & Kahneman (1992; Quiggins, 1982 Quiggins, , 1993 theory; Luce, 2000) .
The participants chose between
. We assume that participants first assign a prospect value to each lottery We assume that the participant computes the decision variable
where  is a Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and decision variance Because our outcomes are non-negative, we can model the utility function by the power function
with one parameter 0   . We model the probability weighting function by probability as probability weighting function with a single parameter  , There are competing models for how decision makers weight probability (Prelec, 1998; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) 
is equivalent to 
ANALYSIS & RESULTS
In each experimental condition and for each participant, and estimated parameters by maximum likelihood (Mood, Graybill & Boes, 1974) . We combined data across the six probability conditions (.1, .2, .4, .6, .8, .9), a total of 396 trials
The  which we will use in testing hypotheses as described below.
We similarly fit the data for the classical decision phase, obtaining estimates of , ,  by minimizing,
Note that we fit an additional parameter k  that captures any tendency on the participant's part to compress or expand the response scale.
Distortion of probability weight functions
In all three conditions, we found large individual differences in the -estimates, indicating that the extent to which probability information was distorted varied across participants. In the visual task, individual -estimates varied between 0.31 and 1 (median 0.725). In the classical decision task, individual -estimates ranged from 0.28 and 2
(median 1.05). In the estimation task, we found large individual differences in -
estimates with values across participants that ranged from 0.36 to 1.55 (median 1.08).
Visual and classical decision tasks. The estimates for
, are summarized in Figure 3A Figure 3B shows boxplots indicating mean and confidence intervals for visual and classical decision task, for pooled parameter estimates specifying the probability weight function (pooled across 12 participants). The parameter estimates differed significantly for the visual and classical decision task for 8 of the 12 participants (log-likelihood-ratio-test, p=.05).
We believe that the lack of probability weighting (on average) in the classical decision session is due to the feedback which participants received on each trial.
Decision makers faced with a series of decisions tend to move closer to maximum expected gain (see Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992; Wakker, Thaler & Tversky, 1997; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) . Studies of risky decision find that participants are closer to maximizing expected gain for small stakes (Camerer, 1992; Holt & Laury, 2002; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Wedell & Böckenholt, 1994) .Similar results are found for motor tasks analogous to decision making (Trommershäuser, Maloney & Landy, 2003a,b; .
We also tested whether estimates of the frequency that the bullet would hit the target were little distorted.
Probability estimates and the visual decision task. We considered whether the observed distortions in probability weight could be due to misperception of the frequency with which the stochastic bullet hit targets of different widths. We first tested the hypothesis that only marginally significantly different from 0 (p=0.066). This outcome is consistent with previous work comparing estimates and use of probability in decisions under risk or uncertainty (Ungemach et al, 2009; Wu et al, 2009 Wu et al, , 2011 .
Distortion of value functions
The CPT value function for gains is controlled by a single parameter  which we reduced to a single parameter C above. The estimates for each participant in the visual and classical decision tasks are denoted compressive as is typically the case for lotteries with non-negative outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) .
We finally tested whether participants treated information about reward similarly in the two decision conditions. We compared Ungemach et al. (2009 ) and Wu et al. (2009 , 2011 compared human performance in classical decision making with information about probability and outcomes was explicitly given to performance in a matched decision task where knowledge of probability was obtained by observing or sampling stochastic events. Ungemach et al and Wu et al both found that decision makers in the classical task typically overweighted small probabilities and underweighted large. In contrast, they found the opposite pattern for the matched task based on relative frequency, suggesting that the shape of the probability weighting function changes markedly when probability is obtained in the form of relative frequency of events.
CONCLUSION
We tested this conjecture by comparing performance in a classical decision task with performance in a visual decision task. Participants practiced firing bullets at rectangles several hundred times. In this visual decision task the participant chose between firing a bullet at a larger, easier to hit rectangle for $1 or a smaller, harder to hit rectangle for $2. We varied the widths of the rectangles from trial-to-trial and the objective probabilities of success in the visual task and the classical task were matched, trial-by-trial.
We rejected the conjecture. In the visual task the values v  were all less than 1, indicating that participants typically overweighted small probabilities and underweighted large, the opposite of the pattern found by Ungemach et al (2009 ) and Wu et al (2009 , 2011 . Our results echo those of Gonzalez & Wu (1999) who discuss differences in the shape of the probability weight function across tasks and individuals.
We find that they do not, even after 300 practice trials and 396 decision trials.
Sample size alone is not sufficient to account for differences in human choice in decisions from description and decision from sampling."
In summary, we compared performance in a decision from description task and a decision from sampling task where the source of uncertainty was a stochastic visual event. We found that, even after many trials, participants' probability weighting functions for description and sampling were significantly different and those from sampling showed marked overweighting of small probabilities, underweighting of large. Even with probabilities estimated as the frequency of large numbers of visual events observers do not maximize expected utility.
The task we consider is representative of a large class of everyday tasks where we learn about the stochastic outcomes of events by observing, a quintessential form of decision from experience. We might expect that, with hundreds of trials of training and decision, human performance would move toward choices maximizing expected utility. It does not. 
